



The idea ofa "central bank" in the United States
arose from widespread concern over recurring fi-
nancial crises and panics early in this century.
Those crises and panicswerecaused byan "inelas-
tic" suppIy ofcurrencyandcreditand theabsence
ofa central bankthatcould balancethe amountof
money and credit available with the American
economy'sabiIitytoproduceand consume goods
and services. Theformthis central banktook is the
subjectofthis Letter.
The authors ofthe Federal Reserve Act in 1913
conceived ofa decentralized central banking sys-
tem involvingacombinationofprivateand public
interests. Theycreated thisstructuretodispel wide-
spread concern overaconcentrationofeconomic
power-in this case, money and credit-in the
hands ofeither the nation's banks (especially the
large Eastern banks) orthe nation's politicians.
At the time, the term central bank, with its conno-
tations ofcentralized powerand.control, was so
unpalatable to segments ofthe public that itdid
not appear anywhere in HR 7837, the Federal
Reserve Act. In the intervening 70 years, we have
come to accept the term as entirely appropriate
giventhe dramatic expansion ofthe Federal Re-
serve System's functions in response to the de-
mands ofa rapidly changing and increasingly
complex financial environment. This Letter dis-
cusses the principal provisions ofthe Federal Re-
serve Act to remind us that the decisionmaking
structure ofthe System remains decentralized in a
mannerthat is perhaps unique in American gov-
ernment.
Structure
An elated President Wilson signed the Federal
Reserve Act into lawon December23, 1913. His
desire for a decentralized reserve system with a
"balanced" mixofpublic and private as well as
regional elements, found accommodation in sev-
eral keyprovisionsoftheAct. Onewas thestipula-
tion thatthe numberofFederal Reserve Districts
be "not less than eight or morethan twelve,"
delineated with "due regard to the convenience
and customary course ofbusiness" and "notnec-
essarily coterminous with state lines." Under an
organizing committee headed bythe Secretary of
the Treasury, in consultation with representatives
of banks, clearing houses, major industries and
business associations, delineation ofthe resulting
twelve Federal Reserve Districts occasioned con-
siderable dispute in some sections ofthe country.
Concern for a proper balance ofvarious interests
was reflected in provisions affecting the structure
and composition of both the Reserve Banks and
the Federal Reserve Board. The "private" element
was represented bythe provisions for member
bank stock subscriptions in, and election of, six of
the nine directors ofthe proposed twelve regional
Federal Reserve Banks. These directors were to
include three bankers (Class A), oneeach to be
elected by small, medium-sized and large banks,
and three others (Class B) activelyengaged in
commerce, agriculture orsome other industrial
pursuit (in effect, potential borrowers) who could
not be an officer, directororemployeeofany
bank. The remaining three (Class C) directors, in-
cludingtheChairman and ViceChairman, wereto
be appointed bythe Federal Reserve Board to
representthe general public; they could notbe a
bank officer, directororemployee, orown any
bank stock. Thus, the majorityofeach Reserve
Bank's board would consist ofnon-bank interests.
In 1977, the basis forselectingClass Band Class C
directors was broadened substantially to include
representatives of labor, consumers, and the ser-
vicesector. Furthermore, theselection wastotake
place withoutdiscrimination as to race, color, sex
or national origin. A bill recently passed bythe
House would add two Class C directors, at least
oneofwhom must be representative ofthrift insti-
tutions.
Thedirectorsalsowereempoweredtoappointthe
Bank's officers and employees and "to dismiss
them at pleasure." Atthe outset, the Banks began
choosing a "Governor" as the chiefexecutive
officer. In 1935,Congress changed this positionto
"President" and subjected selection forthis posi-
tiontoformal approval bythe Board ofGovernors.
The Federal Reserve Act provided for stock sub-
scriptions by member banks in partto obviate the
need forgovernmentfinancing. In deferencetoFRBSF
the "dual" system offederal and state bankcharter-
ing, membership was made compulsory for na-
tional banks butvoluntary for state banks, while
stock holdings, which cannotbe traded in the
market, were (and still are) limited to a statutory
dividend of6 percent. The Act also stipulated that
in the eventthat capital subscription by banks
proved inadequate, stock in the Reserve Banks
couId be sold tothegeneral public, andthentothe
Treasury as a last resort. As Congressman Glass,
authorofHR 7837, emphasized, the Reserve
Banks would have "an essentially public charac-
ter" and, exceptfor purposes ofthe Federal Tort
Claims Act, are "instrumentalities" ofthe govern-
mentin theexerciseoftheir majorresponsibiIities.
Contrarytosome assertions, ownershipofFederal
Reserve Bank stock does notvest control ofthe
Reserve Banks (or the determination ofSystem
policies) in memberbanks. The Presidentially ap-
pointed Board ofGovernors must approve the
appointmentofReserve Bankpresidents (and may
removeany Reserve Bank officerordirector), must
approve any change in discount rates, sets the
rules underwhich aReserve Bank may make advan-
ces to depository institutions, and must approve
Reserve Bank budgets underguidelines and limits
which it prescribes. Underguidelines set bythe
Congress, it also sets the prices which the Reserve
Banks charge depository institutions for check
clearing and other payments-related services.
The public natureofthe Federal Reserve System is
further evident in the fact that after operating ex-
penses and paymentofthesmall statutorydividend
on stocksubscriptions, all oftheSystem's netearn-
ings are paid to the Treasury. In 1983, these pay-
ments (mostly earnings from its open market port-
folio and discountoperations) amounted to $14.2
biIIion and represented about 90 percent ofthe
System's gross intome.
Wilson's "capstone"
In the words ofCongressman Glass, the Federal
Reserve BoardwouId represent "theonIyfactorof
centralization in the newSystem." Specifically, he
envisionedthe Board as "analtruistic institution, a
partofthe government itself(but) a distinctly non-
partisan organization whose functions are to be
wholly divorced from politics." Itwould be an
entity created solely for regulating relationships
"betweenthe Federal Reserve Banks and between
them and the government itself.'"
To this end, the Act provided for a seven-member
Board, including, in addition to the Secretary of
theTreasury andtheComptroller, fiveothermem-
bers to be appointed bythe President with the
adviceand consentoftheSenate, with "dueregard
to a fair representation ofthe differentcommercial,
industrial and geographical divisionsofthe coun-
try." At leasttwoofthefiveweretobe experienced
in bankingand finance butcould notbe officersor
directorsofa bankor hold any bank stock. How-
ever, President Wilson did agree to the establish-
mentofa Federal Reserve Advisory Council con-
sisting ofone banker appointed byeach Reserve
Bank to meet at least quarterly with the Board to
discuss business conditions in their respective
Districts.
At the time, only one Board memberwas desig-
nated "Governor" and one "Vice-Governor" (the
others, "members").TheGovernorserved as "ac-
tive executiveofficer" notwithstanding the desig-
nation ofTreasury Secretary as "Chairman." Ini-
tially, the Actdid notfix the term ofeitherthe
GovernororVice-Governor as such, and until
1935,when the Board was renamed the "Boardof
Governors" and its powers and functions consid-
erably expanded (at the expense ofthe Reserve
Banks), the President generally appointed amem-
ber "Governor" for a year at atime, with frequent
annual extensions.
The Act also empowered the President to remove
board members "forcause." However, to help
ensure thattheBoard and the newSystem's "bank-
ing processes" wouId, in the words ofCongress-
man Glass, "be as far removed from all sinister
influences as one pole is from another," the Act
also provided for long and staggered terms for the
five presidentially appointed members (ten years,
after an initial phase-in; theirterms were changed
to 12 years in 1933 and then to 14 years in 1935),
as well as exemption ofthe System from the Con-
gressional appropriations process. The rationale
behind a central bank enjoying a substantial de-
gree of"independence" reflects a tacit recogni-
tion, underscored by historical experience, that it
is notdesirable to place directcontrol overthe
powerto create money in the hands ofthose (the
Congress and the Treasury) whodevelopspending
programs and who pay the government's bills.
Functions
The principal duties ofthe Federal Reserve Board
(which initiallydidnotincludethe powertosetorto vary reserve requirements inasmuch as these
were set by the Act itself) were to "examine the
accounts and affairs ofeach Federal Reserve
Bank," todefinethecharacterorpapereligiblefor
short-term (generally 90-day) discount (but not
including notes drawn for carrying or trading in
stocks and bonds otherthan U.5. government
securitiesL to IIreview and determine" discount
rates set bythe Banks (the word "determine" was
highlyambiguous and shortly led to intense intra-
mural disputes), to appoint the three Class C Re-
serve Bank directors, to suspend or to remove any
Reserve Bank officeror directorfor cause, to "set
the rules" under which the Banks would conduct
"open market operations," and to levy annual
assessments on the Reserve Banks to cover the
Board's expenses.
Reserve Bankofficialssimplydid notthen conceive
ofadministering the discount window in such a
way as to initiate credit and monetary expansion
orcontraction for the ultimate purpose ofdeliber-
ately influencing the movementofaggregate in-
come, output, prices and employment. These
goalswereexpected to be achieved byadheringto
the rules ofthe gold standard then in place. (That
is, ifthecountry lostgold, perhaps as aresu Itofan
adverse trade balance, credit wouId be restricted
and interest rates raised to dampen economic ac-
tivity and domestic prices, thereby making Amer-
ican exports more competitive. This, in turn,
would lead togold inflows, reduced interest rates,
and so on.)
The same was true of '!open market operations,"
includingthe purchase and sale by Reserve Banks
ofnotes, bills, bankers' acceptances and drafts
arising from commercialtransactions plusgovern-
ment obligations. Initially, these operations were
undertaken separately by individual Reserve
Banks simply to provide themselves with a source
ofearnings from which to finance their expenses.
They were not envisioned (or initiallyeven recog-
nized) as a powerful tool ofmonetarypolicy-a
discovery not made until the early years ofthe
"Roaring Twenties."
Reception
The Federal Reserve Actwas not greeted with
universal enthusiasm. Its passage had been marked
by partisan opposition (from Republicans) and 28
abstentionsorabsences inthe final Senate vote. At
its convention in October, 1913, the American
Bankers Association passed aseries ofresolutions
denouncingthe Act as socialistic, unAmerican,
and (because ofits provisions for requiring that
reserves be held atthe Reserve Banks) "confisca-
tory and unconstitutional."
New York investment banker Paul Warburg found
some provisions "deeplyalarming and distress-
ing," and claimed theypromptedthe "determined
opposition on the part ofbusinessmen and bank-
ers." These included Presidential appointment of
members ofthe Federal Reserve Board (which he
thoughtwouId makethe Board "hopelessly politi-
cal"), "excessivedecentraJization"thatwou ld re-
suItfrom twelve Reserve Banks, and the provision
to make Federal Reserve notes obiigations ofthe
U.S. government as well as ofthe Reserve Banks-
a "radical and revolutionary"step, according to
former Senator Nelson Aldrich (R-RIJ, author ofa
rival "central bank"plan thatwould have central-
ized monetary control in private hands.
To many, the structure ofthe Federal Reserve Sys-
tem still seems unnecessarily complex and bewil-
dering. But it is precisely its blend ofregional and
national interests that makes it representative of
the various elements in American society. Its de-
centralized structure, under the "capstone" ofthe
Board ofGovernors, also protects the Federal Re-
serve from the sometimes fierce short-term parti-
san political pressures to which bothCongress and
the Executive Branch are subject. This is exactly
whyCongress has endeavored togivethe System a
substantial degree ofindependence and insula-
tion from political pressures in its day-to-day con-
ductofmonetary policy. This independence takes
placewithin governmentas the Federal Reserve is
still accountableto Congress and mustperiodically
report its plans and objectives for the monetary
aggregates for a year ahead and howthese relate
to the short-term economic goals and projections
ofthe President and Congress.
The Fed's structure, in short, reflects anotherprac-
tical applicationofthe U.S. philosophyoffederal-
ism, onewith its own built-in system ofchecks and
balances.
Verle B.lohnston
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Selected Assets and Liabilities
largeCommercial Banks
10/10/84 10/3/84 Dollar Annualized
Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 183,757 342 7,732 5.5
Loans and Leases1 6 165,059 422 9,704 7.9
Commercial and Industrial 49,921 210 3,958 10.9
Real estate 60,966 64 2,067 4.4
Loans to Individuals 30,268 42 3,617 17.2
Leases 5,036 - 5 - 27 - 0.6
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,630 - 85 - 877 - 8.8
Other Securities2 7,068 5 - 1,095 - 17.0
Total Deposits 192,909 739 1,912 1.2
Demand Deposits 46,684 464 - 2,553 - 6.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,901 1,292 - 430 - 1.7
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,551 - 97 - 224 - 2.2
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 133,674 372 4,689 4.6
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 37,935 170 - 1,662 - 5.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 41,374 232 3,209 10.6







Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings







1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
s Includes borrowing via FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately